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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Do the United States of America and its Supreme Court have anything to 
learn from modern Europe regarding the freedom of religion?  Should 
Europe look to U.S. jurisprudence for guidance on interpreting its own 
religious freedom protections?   
In the twenty-first century, the European Court of Human Rights 
(European Court) has been making controversial headlines in its religion 
jurisprudence.  It has ruled that Italy may hang crucifixes in government-run 
schools,1 but also that Switzerland can prevent Muslim teachers from 
wearing the hijab in its public schools.2  The European Court has allowed 
France to ban the Islamic burqa in public places,3 but it also has required the 
United Kingdom to allow a flight attendant to wear a Christian necklace at 
work.4  These and other important decisions have caught the attention of 
constitutional scholars, who often draw comparisons between these cases and 
the religion jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.5  But are such 
comparisons valid?  This Article will explore that query in a systematic 
fashion.   
One may question—and indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia repeatedly did 
so6—why the Supreme Court ever would consult “foreign precedent,”7 
particularly when the Court is interpreting the U.S. Constitution on a purely 
domestic issue, such as the freedom of religion.  Allowing foreign judges to 
influence modern interpretations of domestic U.S. law seems to ignore the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (Mar. 18, 2011).  
 2 See Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (Feb. 15, 2001).  
 3 See S.A.S. v. France, App. no. 43835/111, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 1, 2014).  
 4 See Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
 5 See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An 
Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
71 (2014); William P. Marshall, The Lautsi Decision and the American Establishment Clause 
Experience: A Response to Professor Weiler, 65 ME. L. REV. 769 (2013); John Witte, Jr. & 
Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New European and American Cases 
on Religious Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 5 (2011); Andrea 
Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 627 (2011). 
 6 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
basic premise . . . that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world . . . ought to be rejected out of hand.”). 
 7 “Foreign precedent” refers to “decisions of foreign courts interpreting their domestic 
laws [or] . . . issues of international law, decisions of supranational tribunals interpreting 
domestic issues of a particular country, and decisions of a supranational tribunal interpreting a 
supranational constitution or bill of rights.”  Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the 
Debate Surrounding the Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2695, 2701 (2006).  The term does not refer to English common law, the backbone of U.S. 
law.  Id. at 2702–03. 
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notion that the American colonies broke their ties with European ideas and 
practices in a fiery revolution.  Indeed, many in the United States today still 
promote the concept of American exceptionalism that Alexis de Tocqueville 
noted early in the nation’s history.8  Having thrown off the shackles of 
Europe, should the Supreme Court now embrace those same old ideas and 
repatriate them to American soil?   
While many scholars today compare religion cases in the United States 
and Europe, no one has yet addressed in detail why that practice is 
legitimate.  This Article tackles that issue by defending the practice of 
consulting foreign precedent, within reasonable limits.  It breaks down the 
problem into three parts, looking first at policy-based objections to the 
practice.  It then explores whether differences between the U.S. and 
European systems invalidate these comparisons.  Finally, it considers 
whether the subject-matter of religion—as protected by the U.S. Constitution 
and the European Convention on Human Rights—makes such comparisons 
futile.  The Article concludes there is value in consulting foreign precedent 
on religion.  Indeed, Europe and the United States may have a few lessons to 
teach one another about the value of religion in modern, pluralistic 
democracies.   
II.  POLICY-BASED LIMITS ON COMPARING THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN 
MODELS 
Regarding the reliance on foreign precedent in modern Supreme Court 
decisions, Justice Scalia passionately argued:  
[I]rrelevant are the practices of the “world community,” whose 
notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our 
people. . . .”  Where there is not first a settled consensus among 
our own people, the views of other nations, however 
enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, 
cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.”9 
Surely he is correct that foreign precedent cannot be imposed upon the 
Supreme Court, but does that mean foreign jurisprudence must have no role 
at all, even as a reference point?   
                                                                                                                   
 8 See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 32 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Debra Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (“The civilization of New England has been like those 
fires lit in the hills that, after having spread heat around them, still tinge the furthest reaches of 
the horizon with their light.”). 
 9 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson 
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69, n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).   
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A policy debate is raging about the propriety of drawing lessons for the 
U.S. Supreme Court from foreign sources, such as the European Court.  In 
recent years, some politicians have bemoaned official references to foreign 
precedent in U.S. jurisprudence.10  The issue has garnered so much attention 
that Republicans in Congress (unsuccessfully) introduced legislation in 2004 
and 2005 that would have prohibited federal courts from using “foreign 
authorities except in special circumstances where the foreign law ‘informs an 
understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.’ ”11  
Some worry that uniquely American ideas will be tarnished if exposed to the 
brushstrokes of a European system that never understood American values.  
Indeed, all this controversy about foreign precedent in domestic legal 
interpretation has generated serious scholarship on both sides of the 
argument,12 yet no one has systematically tackled the issue in the specific 
context of the courts’ jurisprudence on religion. 
From a historical perspective, the Framers considered foreign law when 
designing the U.S. Constitution; however, judges in that founding generation 
generally did not find it appropriate to consult foreign sources when 
interpreting the Constitution.13  It is no surprise, then, that in the first 150 
years of Supreme Court decisions, the Justices almost never referenced 
foreign precedent to resolve a domestic issue.14  Although Chief Justice John 
Marshall made an oblique reference to foreign law in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, the most notable pre-modern use occurred as late as 1905, when 
the Court—interpreting the Equal Protection Clause—referred to Roman, 
                                                                                                                   
 10 See Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign 
Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637; Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The 
International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 273 (2006) 
(recounting several political attacks on the practice, including one by Tom C. Feeney (R-FL), 
who argued that “[t]he Supreme Court has insulted the Constitution by overturning its own 
precedent to appease contemporary foreign laws, social trends, and attitudes” (citing Supreme 
Court Ruling Reiterates Importance of Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, 
U.S. FED NEWS (Mar. 2, 2005))). 
 11 Parrish, supra note 10, at 645. 
 12 See id. (discussing the propriety of using foreign precedent); Cohen, supra note 10, at 
274 (noting the controversy and its “assumption that, for better or for worse, the Court . . . was 
increasingly willing to apply foreign and international law in reaching its decisions,” but 
arguing “that the assumption might not be true”); Benvenuto, supra note 7; see also Harold 
Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004) (arguing in 
favor of the use of international law); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to 
Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004) (arguing against the use of foreign 
precedent). 
 13 Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2704–05.     
 14 Id.; see also Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 409, 420 (2003).  But see Koh, supra note 12 (citing early Supreme Court references 
to the “law of nations” in relation to congressional statutes as a potential contrary example). 
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Napoleonic, and Germanic law to help determine the world’s historical 
recognition of “the power to deal with the estate of an absentee.”15   
After World War II, the modern controversy over foreign precedent 
began to percolate.  Starting in the 1940s, Justice Felix Frankfurter led a 
trend to cite foreign law in Supreme Court opinions, though not as the actual 
rationale for the Court’s decision-making.16  Then, members of the Court 
began referencing foreign precedent when interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment,” with a majority 
of the Court eventually citing “laws of other countries” as “instructive for 
[the Amendment’s] interpretation,” while at the same time insisting that the 
“opinion of the world community” was “not controlling” on the outcome of 
capital cases.17  Still, the dispute over foreign precedent did not blossom in 
earnest until the 1990s, driven largely by the advocacy of five Supreme 
Court Justices from across the political spectrum—Stevens, O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer.18  This high-level promotion eventually led 
to this practice outgrowing its Eighth Amendment roots, with some Justices 
using foreign law when interpreting such varied domestic concepts as 
federalism19 and even affirmative action.20 
Perhaps the most controversial use of foreign precedent involved an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.  In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion cited a conflicting decision from the European Court to support the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that it had wrongly decided the controversial 
Bowers v. Hardwick case, which had found no right to homosexual 
                                                                                                                   
 15 Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2704–05 (citing Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 
458, 570–71 (1905)); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).   
 16 Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2706–08. 
 17 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 578 (2005); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
102 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion) (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual 
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”); Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion) (referencing “legislative 
decisions” from around the world); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) 
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (singling out Europe as a guidepost of “civilized standards of 
decency”). 
 18 Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2711.  Justice Souter, while sometimes citing foreign 
precedent, was not an active advocate of the practice.  Id. at 2711, n.111. 
 19 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the U.S. federal divide is not unique, and arguing that other countries use the opposite 
approach from that adopted by the majority).   
 20 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (comparing 
the Court’s view “with the international understanding of the office of affirmative action,” and 
quoting from an international convention to endorse her point that affirmative action is a 
temporary measure).   
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sodomy.21  This was the first time the European Court had ever been cited in 
the text of a Supreme Court majority opinion.22  Kennedy went on to note, 
“The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral 
part of human freedom in many other countries.  There has been no showing 
that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal 
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”23  In dissent, Justice Scalia 
railed against this “[d]angerous dicta” by the majority, pointing out that 
“[c]onstitutional entitlements” do not spring “into existence, as the Court 
seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize conduct.”24  At 
bottom, Scalia worried that carefully drawn standards based on deeply rooted 
American constitutional-law concepts would be abandoned in order to follow 
the crowd of other countries (especially those in Europe), to the detriment of 
cherished and hard-won rights in the unique experience of the United 
States.25 
Of all the Supreme Court advocates in favor of citing foreign precedent in 
domestic decisions, Justice Breyer has been particularly outspoken about its 
benefits.  He has conceded that “there may be relevant political and structural 
differences between [foreign] systems and our own,” yet he continues to 
believe that the experience of other countries “may nonetheless cast an 
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal 
problem . . . .”26  This is true even in the context of the Establishment Clause.  
For instance, Justice Breyer has admitted that foreign precedent has caused 
him to be “uncertain” about the validity of his dissent in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris.27  In a 2005 debate with Justice Scalia, Breyer stated, “[O]ne of the 
things I had to face from my point of view . . . [was] the fact in France they 
subsidize a religious school and it isn’t the end of the earth.  And the same 
thing is true in Britain, other countries.”28  In other words, by looking at how 
established religions operated in modern European democracies, Breyer 
began to question his stated concern in Zelman that allowing government-
                                                                                                                   
 21 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (“[A]lmost five years before Bowers 
was decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to 
Bowers. . . .”); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192–95 (1986).   
 22 See Koh, supra note 12, at 50. 
 23 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 24 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for bringing foreign law into the 
mix, arguing that “this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on 
Americans” (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n., (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari))). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 27 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 28 Federal News Service, Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law 
(Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2017 2:58 PM 
8  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 45:1 
funded vouchers in religious schools would cause political dissension in 
society.29 
Despite resistance to foreign precedent, even those who oppose the 
practice acknowledge its validity to some degree.  For example, in his debate 
with Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia agreed,  
[Y]ou can cite foreign law to show, as Justice Breyer gave an 
example, to show that if the Court adopts this particular view, 
the sky will not fall.  You know, if we got much more 
latitudinarian about our approach to the Establishment Clause, 
things won’t be so bad . . . . It’s useful for that.30 
And, indeed, Scalia made the occasional useful reference to foreign law as a 
benchmark in some of his dissenting opinions.31  Similarly, Justice Alito 
(joined by Thomas) has referred to foreign precedent to establish the 
existence of Western legal traditions: “Nor is the right to same-sex marriage 
deeply rooted in the traditions of other nations.  No country allowed same-
sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in 2000.”32  And more 
recently, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Scalia and Thomas) noted that, 
“[h]ere and abroad, people are in the midst of a serious and thoughtful public 
debate on the issue of same-sex marriage . . . .  They see countries overseas 
democratically accepting profound social change, or declining to do so.”33   
What does all this mean, then?  Some Justices believe that foreign law 
should be liberally used to help shed light on the interpretation of the 
Constitution and to provide invaluable insight into the various potential 
approaches to government and constitutional theory.  For others, it is 
appropriate to use foreign precedent as a window to the past to help 
understand which rights are “deeply rooted” in Western tradition or “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”34  And even those Justices who oppose the 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 719–29. 
 30 Federal News Service, supra note 28.  
 31 See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381–82 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing in favor of bans on “anonymous campaigning” by referencing state and 
federal government parallels, as well as “the legislatures of foreign democracies: Australia, 
Canada, and England, for example, all have prohibitions upon anonymous 
campaigning . . . .  How is it, one must wonder, that all of these elected legislators, from 
around the country and around the world, could not see what six Justices of this Court see so 
clearly . . . ?”); see also Koh, supra note 12 (arguing in favor of using international law and 
pointing out consistencies in Scalia’s position on this issue). 
 32 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).   
 33 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624–25 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 34 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (recounting the legal test to 
determine whether unenumerated human rights should be constitutionally protected as part of 
substantive due process). 
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use of foreign law must concede that it can serve a limited purpose as a 
policy matter—perhaps merely as an object lesson to see how some policies 
succeed or fail. 
Under all these approaches, therefore—despite the protests of some 
Justices—there is universal recognition of some legitimate purpose to consult 
what the European Court (and other courts) have to say on matters that 
impact domestic constitutional interpretation.  Though there may be limits to 
such comparisons based on the policies and philosophies of the Justices, 
there is value in exploring lessons from the European Court on issues such as 
the freedom of religion. 
III.  SYSTEM-BASED LIMITS ON COMPARING THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN 
MODELS 
The prior section concluded that policy-based considerations do not rule 
out the validity of comparing the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the European Court.  One might wonder, however, whether systemic 
differences between the courts are so profound as to make comparison futile.  
In fact, the opposite is true.  While notable structural differences do exist, 
they do not invalidate the benefit of comparing how the two courts handle 
religion-based claims. 
When assessing judicial approaches to the freedom of religion, one can 
choose among several European courts, such as the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)35 or the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).36  No 
other tribunal, however, compares with the European Court—a permanent 
judicial body located in Strasbourg, France, which, since 1950, has become 
the arbiter of Europe’s fundamental rights under the ground-breaking 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
                                                                                                                   
 35 The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) and a direct successor 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which began in 1922.  It has been in 
existence since 1946 as a key component of the UN Charter.  RUTH MACKENZIE, CESARE 
ROMANO, PHILIPPE SANDS & YUVAL SHANY, THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 4–5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2010).  To individuals with concerns about 
religion, however, this court is of little help, because only states may bring an action.  See id. 
at 12. 
 36 Known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) prior to 2009 and the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
CJEU is located in Luxembourg as the principal judicial organ of the European Community 
(EC).  See id. at 253.  It is responsible for cases that involve the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which includes in Article 10 a provision protecting freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion.  See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 10, Dec. 18, 2000, 
2012/C 326/02.  (EUCFR) The CJEU rarely will deliver a judgment on the topic of freedom of 
religion.  But see Cases of Y(C-71/11) and Z(C-99/11), ECLI:EU:C:2012:518. 
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(ECHR).37  The European Court decides comparatively few religion cases in 
its vast case load.38 
Admittedly, there are important systemic distinctions between the 
Supreme Court and the European Court.  As discussed below, however, key 
similarities between the courts leave ample room for drawing legitimate 
parallels in their jurisprudence.  
A.  Differences in Structure Between the Two Courts 
Four noteworthy structural distinctions separate the Supreme Court and 
the European Court, relating to the foundational documents from which each 
court originated, the scope of each court’s judicial review, the composition of 
each court, and the enforcement of each court’s judgments.  The first 
difference involves the foundational documents from which each court 
originated.  Unlike the Supreme Court—which is authorized by a domestic 
federal constitution mostly concerned with the separation of government 
powers—the European Court was created by an international human rights 
convention for the purpose of monitoring the Council of Europe and its 
member-states.39  This distinction, however, is not overly significant in the 
context of interpreting individual rights, such as the freedom of religion.  
Indeed, both courts protect fundamental rights on a case-by-case basis.  For 
instance, in the context of cases raised by couples denied the right to marry 
within their states, the Supreme Court recognized a nationwide constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage.40  Similarly, in the context of an individual 
complaint from Northern Ireland, the European Court recognized that the 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (1950), as amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 
155 (1994). 
 38 “From 1959 to 2009, the European Court . . . found a total of thirty [religion] 
violations . . . .  By comparison, during that same forty-year period, the Court found some 4008 
violations . . . concerning the fairness and length of proceedings . . . .”  Witte & Arold, supra 
note 5, at 14–15; see also MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 335. 
 39 Created by the ECHR, the Council includes forty-seven member-states: Albania, 
Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, 
Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.  See Our Member States, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2017), 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states. 
 40 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  This action by the Court, however, 
was heavily criticized by the dissenting justices as an inappropriate act of judicial legislating, 
instead of constitutional interpretation. 
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ECHR provided all consenting European adults the right to engage in 
homosexual activity without criminal sanction.41 
This focus on individual cases creates an additional similarity between the 
courts.  Due to its limited federal jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, the Supreme Court must wait for properly raised individual 
cases before it can define fundamental rights.42  In the same way, before the 
European Court can enforce human rights under the ECHR, it must await 
applications from member-states, non-governmental organizations, or 
individuals alleging that a member-state has violated rights secured by the 
Convention and its protocols.43  In other words, neither court can 
affirmatively seek out cases or target government policies to overturn.   
The second structural difference involves the scope of each court’s 
judicial review.  Outside of a handful of cases falling within its original 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court operates as a pure appellate court, with little 
competency in the first instance to find facts and assign damages.44  In 
contrast, although mostly resembling an appellate tribunal, the European 
Court regularly exercises fact-finding powers associated with trial courts, 
including the ability to conduct an examination, complete with witnesses and 
documentary evidence.45  Further, if the domestic law of a member-state 
cannot provide full satisfaction for an injury, the European Court may 
fashion a remedy of “just satisfaction,” with both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages.46  Undeniably, these are significant judicial powers; 
however, these distinctions do not foreclose a comparison of the two courts.  
Even though the European Court has distinct fact-finding and remedial 
powers, it shares with the Supreme Court the key interpretive authority to 
determine the scope of fundamental rights—the critical point of comparison 
in religion cases.    
The third structural difference involves the composition of the courts.  
The Supreme Court consists of nine independent Justices with lifetime terms, 
who decide all cases together and have extensive control over their own 
                                                                                                                   
 41 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).  Unlike the Supreme 
Court, the European Court has not yet found a European consensus to recognize a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage. 
 42 Jeffery S. Gutman, 2.1 Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR 
LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS (2013), http://federalpracticemanual.org/chapter2/section1. 
 43 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS THE LIFE OF AN APPLICATION, http://www.echr.coe. 
int/Documents/Case_processing ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
 44 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–92 (1982) (stating that “factfinding is 
the basic responsibility of [lower] courts, rather than appellate courts” (citing DeMarco v. 
United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974))). 
 45 ECHR, art. 38.   
 46 Id. art. 41; MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 353–54. 
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docket.47  In contrast, the European Court consists of forty-seven judges (one 
from each member-state) appointed to nine-year, non-renewable terms.48  
They decide cases in a single-judge formation, three-judge committees, 
seven-judge Chambers, or a seventeen-judge Grand Chamber,49 and they 
have little control over their docket, except in those cases accepted for final 
review by the Grand Chamber.50  While these distinctions are notable, they 
bear little on the key reason to compare the courts’ jurisprudence—assessing 
the strengths or weaknesses of each court’s interpretation of individual 
rights.   
The final structural difference involves the enforcement of each court’s 
judgments.  Although the Supreme Court must rely on the federal political 
branches to ensure the efficacy of its judgments, the Court has enjoyed 
notable success even when ushering in major societal changes, such as 
declaring an end to segregated schools or mandating rights to abortion and 
same-sex marriage.  In contrast, the European Court is not capable of 
enforcing its own decisions.  The judgments, though binding, are executed 
under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe—a sometimes time-consuming and ineffective process.51  Worse, as 
illustrated by the United Kingdom’s resistance to the European Court’s 
prisoner voting cases,52 if a member-state ignores a judgment of the Court, 
                                                                                                                   
 47 U.S. CONST., art. III, sec. 1 (providing that the Justices “shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour”); 28 U.S.C. § 1 (LexisNexis current through PL 114-327) (setting number of 
Justices); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (LexisNexis current through PL 114-327) (providing for 
review by writ of certiorari). 
 48 ECHR, arts. 20, 23(1).  Member-states nominate three candidates, and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe further elects one judge.  See ECHR art. 22; MACKENZIE, 
ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 337–38.   
 49 ECHR, supra note 37, art. 26.   
 50 Id. arts. 26–27; European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, rr. 24–30 (Nov. 14, 
2016), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf.  In the Grand Chamber, a 
panel of five judges decide whether the case raises a “serious issue of general importance.”  
Id. at r.73; see also ECHR, supra note 37, art. 43; Rules of Court, supra note 50, at r. 73. 
 51 ECHR, supra note 37, art. 46(2).   
 52 In a series of cases beginning in 2005, the European Court found multiple violations by 
the United Kingdom regarding its failure to permit prisoners to vote in U.K. elections, in 
violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR.  See Hirst v. United Kingdom, 2005-IX 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 187 (Oct. 6, 2005); Greens v. United Kingdom, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (Nov. 
23, 2010); Firth v. United Kingdom, App. no. 47784/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 12, 2014); 
McHugh v. United Kingdom, App. no. 51987/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 10, 2015).  The Court 
has noted the United Kingdom’s failure to follow the Hirst decision, which was met with an 
enormous backlash in the United Kingdom, with some leaders even threatening to withdraw 
the United Kingdom from the ECHR.  The Council of Ministers has twice called upon the 
United Kingdom to follow the Hirst decision; however, the United Kingdom still has not 
complied.  Although in 2013 a U.K. Parliamentary committee reviewed a draft bill, the U.K. is 
unlikely to comply, and the government intends to write a full response to this report 
sometime in 2016.  See Jack Simpson Caird, Prisoner’s Voting Rights: Developments Since 
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compliance can be achieved only through a delicate and sometimes 
ineffective process of diplomacy. 
As can be seen, none of these four structural differences poses an 
insurmountable obstacle to comparing the jurisprudence of the two courts on 
individual rights such as the freedom of religion.  Moreover, the two courts 
share other similarities in their procedures.  For instance, both courts permit 
third parties (such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other 
states with an interest) to intervene as amicus curiae.53  This allows for full 
development of the issues and for the expression of varied positions about 
individual rights.  Also, if there is “imminent risk of irreparable damage,” 
such as loss of life or torture, both courts have the ability to preserve rights 
while a case is being considered.54  Additionally, both courts use oral 
argument to assist in deciding cases, although the Supreme Court hears 
argument in far more cases and employs a much more active method of 
questioning the advocates during those arguments.55   
In sum, while structural dissimilarities may impact how the judges 
operate, these differences do not nullify the legitimacy of comparing the two 
courts’ jurisprudence.  Indeed, as discussed below, a core “similarity of 
focus” between the courts favors a comparison of their cases involving 
individual rights, such as the freedom of religion. 
B.  Similarity of Focus: Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Margin of 
Appreciation 
Despite the structural differences noted above, when dealing with matters 
of individual rights, the focus of the Supreme Court Justices and the 
European judges is often similar.  Indeed, the two courts operate in 
somewhat parallel systems because the entities subject to their rulings are 
sovereign states.  In this way, the U.S. system of “federalism” dovetails with 
the European Court’s experience as a supra-national body governed by the 
principle of “subsidiarity.”   
The Supreme Court has affirmed that the U.S. Constitution operates 
within the bounds of federalism—a doctrine that recognizes the federal 
                                                                                                                   
May 2015, U.K. PARLIAMENT (Feb. 15, 2016), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/Research 
Briefing/Summary/CBP-7461.  
 53 See ECHR, supra note 37, art. 36; Rules of Court, supra note 50, at r. 44; see also 
MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 351. 
 54 For instance, the European Court may have the parties adopt “interim measures” while 
the case is decided.  MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 346 (citing 
Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, para. 104 (Feb. 4, 2005)). 
 55 See ECHR, supra note 37, art. 40; Rules of Court, supra note 50, at r. 58–59, 63; see also 
MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 351. 
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government as one of delegated powers.  James Madison summed up the 
concept this way:  
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite . . . .  The powers reserved to the several States will 
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State.56 
Partly due to federalism principles, the Supreme Court polices its own 
jurisdiction with constitutional and prudential doctrines, such as standing, 
and by enforcing common law and statutory requirements to exhaust 
remedies at the state level.57  By limiting the number and types of cases 
available for federal judicial review, the Court better preserves the power of 
the sovereign states to act within their own spheres of authority.  This, in 
turn, maintains an important constitutional balance set in place to limit the 
power of the national government and to divide power in order to avoid 
tyranny.   
Likewise, at the European Court, the principle of subsidiarity—stemming 
from the ECHR—provides that “the task of ensuring respect for the rights 
enshrined in the Convention lies first and foremost with the authorities in the 
Contracting States rather than with the [European] Court.  The Court can and 
should intervene only where the domestic authorities fail in that task.”58  Due 
to this principle, the European Court strictly enforces the ECHR’s 
requirement that cases be submitted within six months from the date of a 
final domestic decision, and that the petitioner exhausts all ordinary, 
reasonably available legal remedies through courts and channels in the 
member-state.59  In addition, the European Court scrutinizes alleged human 
rights violations with a strict eye to weed out cases that are unnecessary to 
decide, in deference to the sovereign states living under the ECHR—much 
like U.S. federal courts.   
                                                                                                                   
 56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
 57 For instance, in habeas corpus cases, a tradition of common and statutory law has 
affirmed the requirement that prisoners exhaust state remedies.  See Duckworth v. Serrano, 
454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (“The exhaustion requirement . . . serves to minimize friction between 
our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass 
upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights.”). 
 58 Interlaken Follow-Up (Note by the Jurisconsult), EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ¶ 2 
(Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Follow-up_ENG.pdf.  
 59 See MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 342–43.    
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2017  2:58 PM 
2016] PUTTING FAITH IN EUROPE 15 
The similarity of this practice to the U.S. Supreme Court can be seen 
most clearly in two European doctrines: “admissibility” and the “margin of 
appreciation.” 
1.  Admissibility Doctrine 
The European Court’s doctrine of admissibility leads to the dismissal of 
most filed petitions,60 including those alleging violations of the freedom of 
religion—a convenience that approximates the Supreme Court’s ability to 
control its docket by dismissing most petitions for a writ of certiorari without 
explanation.  Additionally, this European doctrine often promotes the same 
policies that undergird the Supreme Court’s Article III and prudential 
justiciability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness.   
The first prong of the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine61 focuses on 
whether a party was sufficiently injured to bring a federal case.  In the same 
way, a European Court petition may be inadmissible because it fails to 
provide sufficient information about an injury, or fails to show that the 
applicant “suffered a significant disadvantage.”62  As an example, in Avilkina 
v. Russia, the European Court dismissed a petition by a Jehovah’s Witness 
member who claimed she was injured because of her religious status when 
Russia disclosed her medical files, in violation of the non-discrimination 
provisions of the ECHR.63  The facts of record, however, did not back up that 
alleged injury: no actual files had been disclosed for that particular 
applicant.64   
Another injury-related reason to dismiss a case as inadmissible involves 
applicants who file “manifestly ill-founded” petitions.  For instance, in Mann 
Singh v. France, a Sikh complained under the ECHR when France denied 
him a driver’s license because his passport photo was not “bareheaded,” as 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Since 1998, a major case load increase at the European Court, but for example, over 90% 
were inadmissible in 2013.  See European Council, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMANS (2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_gui 
de_ENG.pdf.  
 61 The doctrine of standing “serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp 
the powers of the political branches . . . .  To establish Article III standing, an injury must be 
‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 
redressable by a favorable ruling.’ ”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 nn.46–47 
(2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010)) (or 561 
U.S. 139, 149).      
 62 MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 348–50; ECHR, supra note 37, 
art. 35; Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, May. 13, 2004 arts. 
7, 8, CETS 194.  
 63 Avilkina v. Russia, App. no. 1585/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 7, 2013).  
 64 Id. 
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required by the rules—instead, he wore a turban to comply with his religious 
mandate to wear the headpiece at all times.65  The European Court found the 
application manifestly ill-founded because the rule—while clearly interfering 
with the Sikh’s religious observances—was “justified in principle and 
proportionate to the objective” of “public safety and protection of public 
order” and necessary “due to the increased risk of fraud and forgery of 
driving licenses.”66  This aspect of admissibility—seemingly judging the 
merits of claims without entertaining a complete examination—grants even 
greater deference to sovereign states than the U.S. Supreme Court’s standing 
doctrine.  Of course, the Supreme Court engages in a similar practice when it 
regularly denies certiorari on cases that are not deemed important enough to 
be heard by the Justices. 
Other aspects of the admissibility doctrine resemble the second and third 
prongs of the Supreme Court’s standing inquiry—lack of causation and lack 
of redressability.67  Notably, the European Court will not entertain petitions 
that bring a claim against an entity that is not a party to the Convention, or 
that seek to redress a right that is not secured by the ECHR.68  In Stephens v. 
Cyprus, a woman alleged under the ECHR that the United Nations had 
denied her access to her home without compensation while Turkish and 
Greek-Cypriot forces were fighting in the area in 1974.69  The European 
Court found the complaint to be inadmissible because the United Nations 
“has a legal personality separate from that of its member states and is not a 
Contracting Party to the Convention . . . .”70  In other words, her claim of 
injury was not within the Court’s jurisdiction. 
A petition may also fail if the injury has not yet come to full fruition—the 
ripeness doctrine.71  In Ligue des Musulmans de Sulsse v. Suisse, the 
European Court considered a challenge to a Swiss constitutional amendment 
that banned the building of Muslim minarets.72  The Court ruled the case 
inadmissible because it was brought by those who did not allege that they 
intended to erect such buildings in the future, and who were not direct 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Mann Singh v. France, App. no. 4479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 13, 2008). 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
 68 See ECHR, supra note 37, art. 35; Protocol 14, supra note 62, arts. 7–8; MACKENZIE, 
ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 348–50.  
 69 Stephens v. Cyprus, App. no. 45267/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 28, 2007). 
 70 Id. 
 71 The ripeness doctrine helps “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative 
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative 
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).   
 72 Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse v. Suisse, App. no. 66274/09 (June 28, 2011). 
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victims of the alleged Convention violation.73  Although most scholars, 
including the Swiss government itself, opined that the ban would be a 
violation of the freedom of religion under the ECHR, the Court did not even 
reach the question because the challenge lacked a ripe injury.   
Finally, sometimes an inadmissible petition raises previously resolved 
issues that no longer justify review—mootness.74  For example, in Oleksy v. 
Poland, the applicant—a former Prime Minister of the nation—complained 
of several deprivations of his rights as a defendant in a criminal trial, in 
violation of the ECHR.75  The Supreme Court of Poland previously 
overturned his conviction and required that the proceedings against the 
applicant be discontinued.  In light of this action at the state level, the 
European Court ruled the case inadmissible because “any defects which may 
have existed at the time of the applicant’s trial . . . must be considered to 
have been rectified.”76  In turn “the applicant can no longer claim to be the 
victim of the alleged violations of the Convention, as required by Article 
34.”77 
In essence, the European Court’s admissibility doctrine ensures that the 
judges do not needlessly interfere with the workings of member-states.  This 
parallel to the Supreme Court’s practices increases the validity of 
comparisons made between the jurisprudence of the two counts. 
2.  The “Margin of Appreciation” Doctrine 
The European Court’s application of the “margin of appreciation” 
doctrine also bears similarity to regular practices of the Supreme Court.  The 
U.S. system of federalism requires “federal courts to defer to the practices 
and policies of individual states, unless there are clear violations of federal 
constitutional rights . . . .”78  In the same way, the European “margin of 
appreciation “doctrine was created “to address the pluralism of member 
states’ legislation” and to give European nations “adequate space” to 
legislate “according to their different legal traditions, social circumstances, 
and cultural specificities.”79  This principle of deference “recognizes that 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. (“pas plus qu’elles n’allèguent avoir l’intention d’ériger de tels bâtiments à l’avenir. 
Elles ne sont donc pas directement victimes de la violation alléguée de la Convention.”). 
 74 “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes 
of Article III—‘when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome.’ ” Already, LLC, v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013) 
(quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)). 
 75 Oleksy v. Poland, App. no. 1379/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 16, 2009). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Witte & Arold, supra note 5, at 53–54. 
 79 Pin, supra note 5, at 641. 
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national judges are often better placed than international judges to assess 
these culturally sensitive questions” regarding human rights within the 
context of a particular nation’s situation.80 
In the context of religion, the European Court has liberally applied the 
“margin of appreciation” to a wide variety of practices.  For instance, in 
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, the European Court rejected a 
challenge by an ultra-orthodox Jewish organization that was denied the 
ability to ritually slaughter its own meat to ensure compliance with the 
group’s rigid “glatt” religious prescriptions.81  The French government 
denied the group’s license under its animal cruelty laws, because another 
Jewish organization had been granted the license and could provide the meat 
to the applicant group.82  Displaying great deference, a Grand Chamber of 
the European Court found that there had been no interference with the 
applicant’s religious beliefs and that France’s rules fell within the wide 
“margin of appreciation” due to member-states.83  In a very different context, 
in Eweida v. United Kingdom, the two applicants were Christian employees 
who opposed same-sex partnerships on religious grounds, and whose 
consciences prevented them from performing job duties that furthered such 
relationships.84  The European Court upheld their dismissals from 
employment in the United Kingdom, in a display of its usual wide “margin 
of appreciation,” noting that there was no consensus in Europe on the proper 
balance between conscience and accommodations on this sensitive issue.85   
This generous application of the margin of appreciation doctrine provides 
significant deference to the practices of European nations where no clear 
consensus has been established throughout Europe.  In that sense, it is similar 
to the deference the Supreme Court sometimes gives to states under 
federalism principles, especially in certain areas (e.g., education, criminal 
law) traditionally regulated by the states using their general police power, in 
contrast to the limited and delegated powers of the national government 
under the U.S. Constitution.86   
In sum, because both courts are deferential to sovereign states when 
crafting their judicial opinions, legitimate comparisons can be made between 
the U.S. and European systems despite their differences.  This is shown by 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Witte & Arold, supra note 5, at 16. 
 81 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-vII231 Eur. Ct. H.R, (May 31, 2000). 
 82 Id. (concluding that the group could also easily import “glatt” meat from Belgium). 
 83 Id.     
 84 Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
 85 Id. 
 86 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a federal law that 
encroached on an area of traditional state regulation); see also Antony B. Kolenc, Commerce 
Clause Challenges After United States v. Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867 (1998) (discussing 
commerce challenges in other areas of traditional state regulation). 
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the European Court’s strict application of its admissibility doctrine, 
reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s justiciability doctrines.  It also reveals 
itself in the wide margin of deference the European Court provides to 
legislation and adjudications made at the member-state level, recognizing 
that judges at the state level are better situated to vindicate individual rights, 
such as the freedom of religion, in the unique cultural settings of their own 
nations—a policy with parallels to U.S. notions of federalism.     
IV.  SUBJECT-MATTER-BASED LIMITS ON COMPARING THE U.S. AND 
EUROPEAN MODELS 
In the two prior sections, this Article established that policy 
considerations from all points of the political spectrum would allow for some 
comparison between the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
European Court.  In addition, the systemic structure and similar focus of the 
two courts may lend themselves to a legitimate comparison of their 
respective precedents.  Even if one accepts these two propositions, however, 
one might still object that—at least in religion cases—the substance of the 
subject matter differs too greatly between the two systems.  In other words, 
one could argue that the U.S. Constitution and the ECHR are too dissimilar 
regarding religion to offer any useful data.  This line of attack would provide 
the strongest reason to be skeptical of the comparison between the two 
courts.  Still, as discussed below, even this consideration does not foreclose 
the validity of comparing the U.S. and European jurisprudence in this area. 
A.  The First Amendment and Article 9 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in part, that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”87  This single sentence contains two 
Religion Clauses.  The first part of the sentence—known as the 
Establishment Clause—prevents government from taking steps toward 
setting up a state church; while the second part—the Free Exercise Clause—
protects against government hindrances to religious faith and practice.  Yet 
this dearth of words has left many unanswered questions for the Supreme 
Court to decide.   
The Religion Clauses provide no guidance on how to adjudicate 
establishment claims or assess free exercise violations.  They lay out no 
jurisprudential tests for the Supreme Court to apply, and they do not define 
key terms, such as “respecting” or “establishment.”  Indeed, the term 
                                                                                                                   
 87 U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
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“religion” appears to leave non-religious conscience rights unprotected by 
the First Amendment.88  All this ambiguity has left the Supreme Court with 
free reign to interpret terms and define the scope of the Religion Clauses 
with few textual limitations.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has struggled 
over the years to define workable tests to measure these areas, leading to the 
development of the oft-maligned Establishment Clause test articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,89 and the notorious rational basis view adopted in Free 
Exercise Clause cases in Employment Division v. Smith.90   
In contrast, Article 9 of the ECHR provides explicit guidance for the 
European Court to apply when deciding freedom of religion questions.  
Article 9 states: 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion 
or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2.  Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.91 
The first paragraph of Article 9 defines the substantive right in detail, 
protecting both private and public aspects of religion, as well as individual 
and community manifestations of faith.  Unlike the First Amendment, this 
first paragraph expressly includes rights of conscience and non-religion 
under its protective ambit.   
The second paragraph of Article 9 sets forth a jurisprudential ends-means 
balancing test that allows member-states flexibility in structuring their laws 
to achieve proper ends (e.g., safety, health) through appropriate means 
(necessary democratic legal limitations).  In essence, this paragraph requires 
                                                                                                                   
 88 See Eduardo Peñalver, The  Concept  of  Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 802–04 (1997); 
Michael W. McConnell, The  Origins  and  Historical  Understanding  of  Free  Exercise  of  
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481 (1990) (concluding that the Framers excluded 
conscience rights protection in the Religion Clauses, expressly rejecting an earlier version of 
the First Amendment). 
 89 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Antony B. Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s 
Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 831–35 (2007) 
(discussing the criticism of Lemon and evaluating potential replacement tests). 
 90 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990); see also Kolenc, supra 
note 89, at 840–42 (discussing the details of Smith). 
 91 ECHR, supra note 26, art. 9. 
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the European Court to determine whether a member-state has interfered with 
a religious right, and whether a legal basis existed for that interference.  
Article 9 then mandates a balancing test to weigh whether the interference 
was “necessary in a democratic society”—that is, whether it “corresponds to 
a pressing social need, is proportionate to the aim pursued, and is justified by 
relevant and sufficient reasons.”92  In practice, this test has proven to be 
similar to the rational basis test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its free-
exercise jurisprudence.   
So just how different is the subject matter of Article 9 from the U.S. 
Constitution’s First Amendment?  This question is best considered by 
dividing the comparison between the two Religion Clauses. 
B.  Article 9 and the Free Exercise Clause 
The differences between the First Amendment and Article 9 are not as 
great as they appear when considering the Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence after Smith.  In a post-Smith world, the Supreme Court applies 
strict judicial scrutiny only when the government targets religion with laws 
that are either not neutral or not generally applicable.93  Otherwise, the 
Supreme Court’s ends-means analysis in free exercise cases approximates 
the second paragraph of Article 9 of the ECHR by merely requiring that 
governments possess a rational basis to regulate neutral activity that impacts 
religion.   
For instance, in the controversial Smith case itself, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a state government’s generally applicable law that neutrally 
regulated harmful controlled substances, such as the drug peyote, even 
though that regulation substantially interfered with the rights of some Native 
Americans who sincerely practiced a religion that considered peyote use to 
be sacramental.94  The Court found that the state had neutrally sought to 
protect ends that were legitimate (i.e., public health and safety) by generally 
applicable means that were rationally related to those ends (i.e., prohibiting 
ingestion).  Thus, the fact that the law interfered with individual religious 
practice was essentially a non-issue. 
Similarly, consider how the European Court applies the jurisprudential 
test set out in the second paragraph of Article 9.  In S.A.S. v. France, the 
Court upheld France’s facially neutral ban on the wear of any item that 
covered the face in public, despite an acknowledgement by the Court that the 
                                                                                                                   
 92 Witte & Arold, supra note 5, at 16. 
 93 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(applying strict scrutiny to non-neutral, non-generally applicable city laws that targeted the 
Santeria religion’s practice of ritual animal slaughter). 
 94 See generally Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. 
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ban was primarily aimed at preventing Islamic women from publicly wearing 
religious garb, such as a burqa.95  The European Court rejected some of 
France’s proposed ends for the ban (i.e., national security, protection of 
women), but it accepted France’s end of protecting “the rights and freedom 
of others” to ensure that persons can interact in public by seeing each other’s 
faces.96  According to the Court, the means of accomplishing this end by 
“neutrally” banning all facial coverings was “necessary in a democratic 
society.”97   
This ends-means analysis by the European Court approximates what the 
Supreme Court would do if it treated the facts of S.A.S. under the rational 
basis test articulated in Smith.  The Supreme Court could potentially uphold 
the ban by noting France’s legitimate aim to enhance societal interaction, and 
then it could find that banning face coverings is rationally related to that end.  
Of course, one might argue that the Supreme Court would instead find 
France’s conduct in S.A.S. more akin to a specific discrimination against 
religion, thereby causing the Justices to strike down the ban under strict 
scrutiny because France is targeting Islamic garb.98  Whichever test one uses, 
however, this academic exercise demonstrates that the subject matter of 
religion lends itself to a valid comparison between the U.S. and European 
models—at least when dealing with cases that would fall within the Free 
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  
C.  Article 9 and the Establishment Clause 
The argument in favor of comparing the jurisprudence of the two courts 
becomes more challenging when dealing with cases under the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.  For all its detail, Article 9 of the ECHR 
contains nothing that resembles a ban on the state establishment of religion.  
In fact, many European nations—the United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, and several others—continue legally to uphold official 
establishments of religion.  Some might argue that this lack of a European 
Establishment Clause invalidates any attempt to compare religion cases 
between the two systems.  This would overstate the problem, however, and 
ignore important areas of commonality. 
Admittedly, the lack of an Establishment Clause in the ECHR makes it 
difficult to find many helpful comparisons with certain European cases.  For 
instance, in Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland, the European Court dismissed the 
claim of a minority religious group that complained about Iceland’s system 
                                                                                                                   
 95 S.A.S. v. France, App. no. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 1, 2014). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See generally Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 520. 
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of “parish charges” collected from income taxes.99  The European Court 
found the application to be manifestly ill-founded because Iceland’s 
explanation about why it needed to pay extra “tithes” to the state-supported 
national church was “reasonable.”100  Of course, this kind of tithing system 
could never occur in the United States., specifically because of the existence 
of the Establishment Clause.  Still, one might find a useful comparison 
between the cases even in this situation.  For instance, the European Court’s 
analysis of this issue explored whether Iceland’s tithing system neutrally 
treated all religions comparably, and whether Iceland had a reasonable 
explanation for extra funds going to the state-established church.   
The very existence of a “neutrality principle” in the European system may 
be due, in part, to the emphasis on neutrality in U.S. Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  Indeed, this may be an example of the Supreme Court’s 
influence on the European Court, persuading that court to use a stricter 
approach in some cases than the ECHR might otherwise require.  For 
instance, in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the European 
Court found that Moldova had violated Article 9 when it refused to legally 
recognize a “schismatic” Orthodox Christian sect that refused to reconcile 
with a larger Orthodox Church that was already recognized by the state.101  
In essence, Moldova had refused to recognize the sect because it had 
assessed “the legitimacy of religious beliefs” of the group, and had impacted 
its legal rights.  Despite a difficult political environment—Moldova had 
recently emerged from the Soviet Union and this dispute actually may have 
been part of a proxy clash between Russia and Romania—the European 
Court found a violation of “the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality” in 
harming the sect’s legal rights under Moldovan law.102  This case applied the 
neutrality principle in a way that lines up well with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause ruling in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, where 
the Justices nullified a Georgia law that required a jury in a church property 
dispute to determine which side of the dispute was more faithful to the 
religion’s tenets.103  The Court found that “First Amendment values are 
plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the 
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and 
practice.”104   
                                                                                                                   
 99 Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland, App. no. 22897/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 18, 2012).  
 100 Id. 
 101 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 81 (Dec. 13, 
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Therefore, if Europeans have found a neutrality principle in Article 9, 
there may be room to draw parallels with U.S. Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, which also hinges on the concept of government neutrality.  In 
essence, even the lack of an Establishment Clause in Article 9 does not 
destroy all meaningful comparison between the two courts’ jurisprudence in 
this area because there is more overlap than one might think.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court continues to reference foreign precedent in its 
decisions that interpret the U.S. Constitution, especially taking stock of the 
jurisprudence of the Western world and the European Court.  Scholars in 
recent years have also taken an increased interest in the European Court, and 
many of them have examined how the Europeans are resolving difficult 
questions involving the freedom of religion.  Are such comparisons between 
the courts valid? Absolutely. 
Although some Justices have raised policy concerns about the propriety 
of citing foreign precedent, even the staunchest opponent to the practice 
succumbs to the temptation from time to time, comparing how other courts 
around the world have handled problems the Supreme Court may encounter.  
Yet, even those who most strongly support the consultation of foreign law in 
domestic issues have recognized that international norms and practices are, at 
best, guidelines or models for the Supreme Court—not binding precedent to 
be forced upon the American people. 
When it comes to the European Court in particular, several structural 
differences in the composition of the court, its mission, and its procedures 
warrant some caution when drawing comparisons with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.  Still, both courts operate in systems that require deference to 
sovereign states.  Indeed, the focus of both courts require a similar judicial 
temperament when handling alleged human rights violations by member-
states.  More important, both courts have the final word on interpreting the 
scope of individual human rights under their respective systems.  On balance, 
then, none of the structural differences destroy the validity of comparing the 
jurisprudence of the two courts, perhaps even searching for lessons and 
benchmarks to implement in the other system. 
Finally, there are notable differences between the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment and Article 9 of the ECHR.  Indeed, the subject matter of 
each system’s religion protections must ultimately limit the extent to which 
comparisons can be drawn between the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
and the European Court on the topic of religion.  In particular, the absence of 
an Establishment Clause in Europe is the greatest difference, requiring the 
most caution when comparing this jurisprudence.  Yet, accepting those 
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caveats, scholars and judges still may find good use in comparing the 
freedom of religion cases from the European Court with those in the United 
States.   
There may even be some lessons the Americans can learn from Europe 
when it comes to interpreting the Religion Clauses in the future. 
